

FIFCO: Sustainability Champion

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ABSTRACT

This case involves the efforts of Florida Ice & Farm (FIFCO), a leading Costa Rican beverage company, in adopting a “triple bottom line” strategy to measure its performance not only in financial returns to its shareholders but also in social and environmental impacts on society. This initiative was been adopted at a time of financial crisis, severely testing the resolve of FIFCO’s leadership. The case opens in 2003 as a new CEO, Ramón Mendiola, initiates radical changes to bring FIFCO’s productivity into line with the world industry leaders. Having achieved this, plus a growth goal of doubling sales and profits in two years, Ramón presents his executive team with a new challenge: to perform with excellence in the social and environmental, as well as the economic sphere. No sooner is the strategy launched than the company is hit by the world recession and the abrupt passing of a draconian traffic law, reducing revenues by a fifth and putting the company’s social and environmental commitments to a severe test. The case describes the development of the triple bottom line strategy, the double crises of 2008, and the dilemma facing company management in early 2009: how to continue improving economic performance without curtailing social and environmental initiatives?

The case also describes the how the triple bottom line strategy was implemented through a “sustainability balanced scorecard.” Of the 12 objectives set by company management, the case focuses on three: becoming “water-neutral” in 2014; changing the culture of alcohol consumption in Costa Rica; and offering employees a menu of options to serve their communities on company time. By 2011 the results of these and other initiatives placed FIFCO among the top 16 of one thousand companies in emerging nations that were identified by the World Economic Forum and the Boston Consulting Group as having innovative sustainable business practices. As a result, FIFCO was awarded the title of “sustainability champion.” The issue facing Ramón Mendiola at the close of the case is what should be the next challenge for the company. He could continue to consolidate the triple bottom line within FIFCO, or he could spread the philosophy to his business partners in other parts of the value chain. The case presents several alternatives.

Keywords

Sustainability Balanced Scorecard, Triple Bottom Line, Responsible Consumption, Water Neutral, Volunteer Program, Central America, Beer Industry

INTRODUCTION

Seated in the front row of the packed auditorium where the “Annual Meeting of the New Champions” was being held, Ramón Mendiola, CEO of Florida Ice & Farm Company (FIFCO) could still not overcome his surprise at finding himself

in Dalian, China, participating in this world event. It was September 2011, and he had been invited to the meeting, organized by the World Economic Forum in conjunction with the Boston Consulting Group, to receive recognition because FIFCO, Costa Rica’s largest beverage group, had been chosen as one of the “16 New Sustainability Champions.”

In a rigorous contest, the company had competed with some one thousand organizations from emerging countries that were using innovative practices to achieve not just economic results but also to improve the communities in which they operated. Criteria included sustainability, innovation, and scalability. It was FIFCO’s “triple bottom line” strategy, initiated by Mendiola three years earlier that placed it among the winners. Specifically, the company’s development and use of a “Sustainability Balanced Scorecard” to implement the strategy played a key role in the process.

While satisfied with the results achieved over the past three years, Mendiola was already looking ahead to new challenges. Some of the company’s many suppliers and customers had not yet adopted sustainability practices. How could Florida best work with its business partners to extend these practices to other participants in the company’s value chain?

COMPANY BACKGROUND

Founded in 1908 as an ice plant and tropical farm in Limón, Costa Rica by four brothers of Jamaican descent, FIFCO acquired a brewery and with capital from local investors, soon came to dominate the national beer industry. The company became a source of pride for Costa Ricans, admired as a great work environment with generous pay and benefits. Employees described the culture as “brotherly and democratic,” where everyone shared Costa Rican values of solidarity and egalitarianism.

The company enjoyed a leadership position throughout the past century, with the only locally-produced brands in the Costa Rican market, but the 2000’s saw the entry of global giants in the surrounding countries of Central America. The world’s largest brewery, a Brazilian-Belgian consortium, was challenging established national brands in Guatemala and Nicaragua with aggressive prices but with limited success. In El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, the national breweries were acquired by South African Breweries, which had merged with Miller Breweries of the U.S. to become the world’s second largest producer.

In 2003, the FIFCO Board of Directors announced the sale of 25 percent of the company shares to Heineken N.V. of Holland and the retirement of the long-time general manager. He was replaced by Ramón Mendiola, a young Costa Rican executive with an MBA from Northwestern University’s Kellogg School,

formerly Regional Vice President of Kraft for Central America and the Caribbean. An avid tennis player, Mr. Mendiola was energetic and competitive.

After spending his first week on delivery trucks, Mendiola concluded that “there should be a better sense of priority” in distribution. His first action was to replace the functional organization with four strategic business units for beer, non-alcoholic drinks, sales & distribution, and finance & corporate services. He then proceeded to hire managers with the profiles required by the new decentralized structure.

The international consulting firm McKinsey & Co. was hired by FIFCO’s Board of Directors at Mendiola’s suggestion to validate the new structure. The scope of the consultancy was later broadened, at his urging, to include “a search for efficiencies at every link in the value chain.” McKinsey initially identified savings opportunities of \$6 million (on total costs of \$116 million), but in the course of working with company management, additional savings of \$16 million were uncovered. A part of these savings was generated by reducing the workforce from 2,480 to 2,025.

Former colleagues were invited by Mendiola from multinationals in Mexico to share experiences with the latest technological advances being pioneered by industry leaders. “This was a wake-up call,” he recalled. “We realized how far behind we were, so we began an in-depth diagnosis of our organization to find areas needing improvement.” Results of the diagnosis were discussed in a strategic planning workshop, held in September 2003, in which the company’s 60 managers committed themselves to the long-term vision of becoming the most important beverage company in Central America in terms of volume and profitability while maintaining corporate values. The corporate values that they identified were innovation, responsibility, passion, recognition, and teamwork.

In 2003-04, a year of reorganization, the company turned a small operating profit but showed a loss in economic value added (EVA) when the cost of capital employed was subtracted. The new CEO promptly announced that for the first time in the company’s recent history, there would be no year-end bonus. “Not a cent, for any of us” he said. “We wanted to send a clear message.”

In September 2004 a strategic planning retreat was held with company managers in which ambitious cost-cutting goals were set for the next two-year period. The budget became a firm commitment by all sixty members of the management team participating in the retreat. Actions included the installation of ERP¹ modules for cost control in sales, and supply chain. The compensation system for sales employees was changed from 30% variable to 70% variable. “There was strong resistance to this change,” recalled Mendiola, “so we told salespeople that they could keep the 30% system during a trial period, but we also showed them what they would have earned under the 70%

variable system during that same period. Within two months they were all convinced that the change was to their benefit.”

The second strategic planning retreat was held in September 2006. Having met cost reduction goals, Mendiola challenged the management team to double sales revenues and profits in two years. This came as a surprise, since it had previously taken the company seven years to double sales. This ambitious goal was partly achieved through acquisitions including Kern’s, a Guatemalan food and beverage company with a strong presence throughout Central America; and the Pepsi bottling company in Costa Rica, purchased from South African Breweries together with Reserva Conchal, a real estate project including a beach hotel and resort on the Pacific coast. Much of the growth was generated internally, through organic growth of the beer and non-alcoholic businesses.

THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE

By August 2008, FIFCO had achieved its goal of doubling sales and profits, and Ramón began to search for a new goal (see **Exhibit 1** for the financial statements of the company). Not satisfied with generating just economic value, he began to consider the company’s social and environmental impact. Influenced by the ideas of John Elkington², he decided to introduce a “triple bottom line” to incorporate the environment and society in measuring the company’s financial results. In Elkington’s view, the wealth generated by business could not come at the sacrifice of the planet or the abuse of its inhabitants. Companies accepting this view recognized that the triple bottom line had important implications for strategic resource allocation. If an investment did not meet one of the three criteria, it would not be approved.

Working with the new Director of Corporate Relations, Gisela Sánchez, Ramón developed a five-step process to implement the triple bottom line:

Step 1: Consultations and dialogue with stakeholders

The purpose was to understand public perceptions and expectations regarding FIFCO’s social and environmental footprints. Interviews and focus groups were conducted among four stakeholder groups: business partners (including suppliers and employees), clients and consumers, civil society groups, and government and regulatory agencies. While there were concerns among some stakeholders about environmental impact, the major footprint identified by all stakeholders was the social impact of irresponsible alcohol consumption.

Step 2: Strategic planning

The third strategic planning retreat was held among the company’s ninety top managers at the newly-acquired hotel resort on the Pacific coast in September 2008. At this event, Ramón laid down the challenge of the triple bottom line, backed by data from consultations with stakeholders. The mood was one of optimism. The company had just completed the most successful year in its 100-year history, and despite rumblings in the U.S. financial markets, the future of Costa Rica appeared bright. The FIFCO managers took up the challenge of the triple

¹ ERP or “enterprise resource planning” is a management information system that integrates and manages the various functions of a company (manufacturing, warehousing, logistics, human resources, marketing, etc.) The system used by FIFCO was SAP (Germany).

² John Elkington, *Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business*. Capstone: Oxford, 1997.

bottom line, deciding to spend one day on each of the three dimensions. The retreat ended with a commitment on the part of the participants to transmit the strategy to the other 2,200 members of the organization in what Ramón called “the evangelization.” Rolando Carvajal, Director of the Beverages Division, explained that “we are not imposing this, but rather looking for ways to get people enjoying, innovating, and supporting the design of the program, before defining any performance indicator”.

Step 3: Definition of strategic objectives

A major outcome of the workshop was the establishing of 12 strategic objectives: three for the economic dimension, three for the environmental, and six for the social, which was subdivided in internal and external dimensions. The internal dimension was related to the company’s responsibility to employees and their families; the external dimension involved responsibility to the broader society, including the promotion of responsible alcohol consumption. The objectives and their respective dimensions are shown in **Exhibit 2**.

Step 4: Measuring impact

The Balanced Scorecard, introduced in 2006, was being used by Scarlet Pietri, Director of Human Resources as a means of aligning employee performance with strategic objectives. Under the triple bottom line strategy, this tool was adapted to monitor goal achievement along each of the three dimensions. Scarlet explained that “based on the vision of Florida we set the goal of migrating from a traditional Kaplan & Norton scorecard to a triple bottom line model.” The HR Department began by identifying those indicators already being monitored at the plant level, and consolidated them in a macro indicator, “Eco-Florida”, to evaluate the company’s environmental performance. “There is this idea that initiatives in the social and environmental areas can’t be measured, that they are ethereal and not tangible like sales or profits,” said Scarlet, “but that’s just not true. We are measuring such indicators as water usage throughout Florida’s operations.” With the new Sustainability Balanced Scorecard, the variable portion of employee compensation is tied directly to meeting economic, social, and environmental objectives. In the case of the CEO, this variable portion was 65 percent.

Step 5: Accountability to society

As a publicly-traded company, FIFCO made its financial statements available to the general public; and by adopting a triple bottom line strategy, the company resolved to provide the public with information on its social and environmental performance. For greater credibility, the company chose to adopt the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standard, whose mission was to establish uniform sustainability reporting practices. Results could range from “C” to “A+” depending upon the number of indicators being reported and their level of transparency.

This five-step process was repeated every year to provide feedback to the organization and set the annual goals for each of the indicators.

THE DOUBLE CRISIS

In late 2008, the financial crisis affecting the U.S. still seemed remote to most Costa Ricans. With their savings protected by a nationalized banking system with strong regulations, growing trade relations with China, a continuing influx of European ecotourists, and an economy unburdened by defense expenditures, most citizens had little knowledge or concern as to what was happening in Wall Street. The first warning signals were the drop in exports of gourmet coffees and the sudden cancellation of construction projects on the beaches of Guanacaste, favored by U.S. retirees. Then, credit began to become scarce as the Costa Rican banks’ international lines of credit dried up. Still, as the December holidays approached, beer continued to flow. Ramón Mendiola and other FIFCO executives could leave on vacation for a well-deserved rest.

When Ramón returned to work on January 5, 2009, he encountered a double crisis. Costa Ricans, awakened by the credit shortage and the growing economic uncertainty, had cut back on consumption in the New Year. But it was the second crisis that had been the major contributor to this decline in beer consumption. On December 23rd, the National Assembly had suddenly passed several articles of a new traffic law enforcing heavy fines and penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol.³ Ramón was aware of the bill before the Assembly, which had been under discussion since March 2007 and which was consistent with his initiatives for responsible alcohol consumption, but passage was not expected for another ten months. The bill imposed penalties that were among the world’s most severe. Penalties of up to ten years’ imprisonment could be imposed for driving while under the influence of alcohol and that resulted in bodily injury to a third party. The law imposed fines and the loss of one’s driver’s license for driving under the influence (two years’ loss of license for the first offense, four years for the second, and ten years for the third). Fines were equivalent to over a month’s salary of a middle class Costa Rican.

In the face of this double crisis, Ramón asked FIFCO managers to find savings and efficiencies in their respective areas with the goal of maintaining the same operating profit as in 2008, which meant reducing total operating costs by 20 percent. In late February they presented an eight-point plan to (1) increase operating efficiency, (2) reduce non-strategic costs, (3) improve worker productivity, (4) negotiate better input prices, (5) rationalize capital investments, (6) strengthen the client and consumer base, (7) protect cash, and (8) reduce risk, particularly in the company’s Pacific real estate investments. Ramón wondered whether it was realistic to implement this plan in the context of the triple bottom line strategy. The cost reductions and “simplifications in the structure” in point 3, which according to estimates made by the Department of Human Resources meant laying off 430 employees, were in direct contradiction to the social (internal) dimension of the strategy. He had asked Scarlet Pietri, Director of Human Resources, for ideas to reduce the number of layoffs.

³ *Proyecto de Ley, Reforma de los Artículos 44, 111, 123, 124 y 125 del Código Penal.*

IMPLEMENTATION, 2009-2011

One alternative to laying people off was to reduce the number of hours worked, reducing everyone's take-home pay. Scarlet discovered an article in the Costa Rican labor law which allowed for such a reduction, but only if employees unanimously voted to do so. A company appeal for solidarity was successful, and the final number of layoffs, while not eliminated altogether, was reduced to around 130. As a part of the reductions in working hours, the company closed on Fridays at noon. Variable pay was eliminated for executives for the year 2009, which for Ramón was over fifty percent of total compensation.

To demonstrate that the triple bottom line strategy had not been abandoned, Mendiola announced that in the new Corporate Sustainability Balanced Scorecard, the social dimension would count for 30 percent of the company-wide performance evaluation in 2009, and that by 2011 the environmental dimension would count for 10 percent, reducing the economic dimension from 100 to 60 percent. These percentages would apply to the corporation as a whole and to the CEO. Others in the organization had an individual scorecard that included those indicators in the three dimensions that they controlled. An employee's variable remuneration was composed in part by the corporate BSC and in part by his or her personal scorecard. The personal goals established in the scorecard were firm commitments and were not changed during the year because, as Rolando Carvajal explained, "FIFCO managers are very serious about committing to goals, whether these are economic, social, or environmental." One example of a personal Sustainability BSC is shown in **Exhibit 3**.

By 2011 there were 580 employees included in the Sustainability Balanced Scorecard, spanning 13 of the company's 24 levels. Each year the company submitted annual sustainability reports under the standards of the Global Reporting Initiative, audited by Deloitte. In the first report, issued in 2010 and corresponding to 2009, FIFCO received a grade of "B". In the second year, out of 583 reports submitted worldwide, it was one of the 135 companies (23% of the total) that earned a grade of A+.

The sustainability reports covered a broad range of initiatives in non-economic dimensions, including three which both Ramón and Gisela believed were representative of the triple bottom line strategy: responsible consumption and a volunteer program, "Choose to Help," in the social dimension, and becoming "water-neutral" in the environmental dimension. These initiatives also addressed some of the firm's most important footprints according to the feedback gathered in the consultations and dialogue with stakeholders.

Responsible Consumption

In the consultations with stakeholders, the company footprint most frequently mentioned was excessive alcohol consumption. Consequently, this social problem was given highest priority. Statistics on alcohol consumption in Costa Rica revealed that it was infrequent and associated with festive occasions where drinking was excessive, sometimes resulting in automobile accidents or domestic violence (see **Exhibit 4** for data on

alcohol consumption in Costa Rica compared with Quebec, Canada).

FIFCO had run "designated driver" campaigns in the past. Some company executives felt this was a passive approach, but they were unsure about the most effective way to encourage responsible alcohol consumption without damaging business in the long term. Research on international best practice revealed a successful program in Canada run by a non-profit organization, Éduc'Alcool and immediately contacted its directors. According to José Pablo Montoya,

These people have been able to enter into dialogue with government authorities and to establish programs for consumer education. When you look at the indicators for this part of Canada versus those for Costa Rica, you can see that they have higher consumption per capita, but with a more moderate consumption pattern. We found in Éduc'Alcool a model that we should replicate because it will allow us to continue growing as an industry while minimizing the social footprint of excessive alcohol consumption.

Based on the Canadian experience, FIFCO launched a campaign entitled "Moderation as a value" in mid-2009 with the goal of reinforcing this value in the Costa Rican culture, and not just in alcohol consumption. This campaign was launched in a strategic alliance between the Ministry of Health and Florida. All activities were coordinated by the Department of Corporate Relations, charged with the educational component and with managing relations with stakeholder groups; and the strategic business unit for alcoholic beverages, responsible for the company's major brands. However, some tensions were felt among members of the sales force, who were expected to meet short-term volume quotas but also to promote moderation.

At one point a promotional campaign for one of the company's beer brands, "Pay for one, take three" was cancelled because it was inconsistent with the theme of moderation, despite a significant sacrifice in sales. This decision created some confusion and discontent among some members of the Sales and Distribution Division, responsible for a part of the Sustainability Balanced Scorecard having to do with "frequency of consumption."

The "Choose to Help" Program

This volunteer program, in the opinion of many stakeholders, added a human element to the triple bottom line strategy by allowing FIFCO employees to "live the footprints" of the company. Though FIFCO had long practiced philanthropy, donated to various causes, and carried out social welfare projects, it was this volunteer program that consolidated its social and environmental projects in an array of twelve options that reflected the new strategy. Officially launched in January 2009, when an employee lost his home in a devastating earthquake in Costa Rica's central valley, the effort soon involved 1,100 employees who donated 8,880 hours as volunteers in the reconstruction of 13 houses near the earthquake's epicenter.

Following this emergency response, the company developed a portfolio of strategic projects that would contribute to the social and environmental goals of the triple bottom line. One such project was the “Aqueduct in the indigenous community of Gavilán Canta” which contributed to the goal of water neutrality or “The remodeling of the Center for Driving Education” to improve road safety education. By 2011, the company’s employees had to provide at least two days (16 hours) of voluntary work each year. Participation in this program would be scheduled during working hours. This requirement applied to all employees, including the CEO. The annual number of volunteer hours reached 48,715 in 2011, with the company investing 5.9% of its net profits in these types of projects⁴. The volunteer program contributed not only to the achievement of the social and environmental goals, but also to increase the identification of the employees with the firm’s values and triple bottom line strategy.

Becoming Water Neutral

As a beverage company, water was a strategic resource for FIFCO, used not only in the composition of its products but also as a part of its production process. Therefore, the company set as a goal “to become water neutral in 2012.”

FIFCO applied the method of “measure-reduce-compensate” to comply with its environmental goals including water, solid waste and carbon neutrality. The three steps were (1) monitor the current situation and measure the operational footprint, (2) reduce usage of the resource to the lowest possible level, and when further reductions were no longer possible, (3) compensate by generating or saving the resource externally.

In Mendiola’s first year as CEO (2003-04), FIFCO consumed 14 liters of water for every liter of beverage produced according to the plant-level indicator used at the time. Efforts to reduce water consumption had begun immediately, reaching 8 liters by 2008. This was accelerated with the introduction of the triple bottom line strategy, and by 2011 the figure stood at 4.72 liters versus a world benchmark and FIFCO goal of 3.5 liters.

To compensate for its water footprint, FIFCO used the “Water Footprint Assessment Manual,”⁵ published by the WFN (Water Footprint Network), which included definitions and accounting methods for the water footprint. Using this Manual, FIFCO implemented community initiatives for water compensation such as the construction of the aqueduct in the community of Gavilán Canta or through the payment of environmental services, such as the protection of 449 hectares (1,123 acres) of forest in the upper basin of the Segundo River and 370 hectares in Santa Cruz.

THE FUTURE

⁴ *Reporte Anual de FIFCO*, fiscal year 2010-2011.

⁵ In accordance with the methodology described in this manual, water footprints were calculated for individual processes and products, as well as for consumers, countries, and companies. The manual also included a library of options for improving the water footprint, and methods for evaluating the sustainability of those improvements.

Having received global recognition as a Sustainability Champion, Ramón began to consider the next great company goal. He wanted to promote the triple bottom line strategy among the company’s suppliers and clients, thus ensuring that the gains made by the company were not lost in other parts of the commercial value chain. The question was where to begin?

One advantage of beginning upstream was that the company had already developed a manual of social responsibility for suppliers, a code for responsible suppliers and had even evaluated 90 suppliers with sustainable business practices. Gisela Sánchez commented:

Before the triple bottom line, we had an ABC for our suppliers which told us how much they bought and how important their material was for the uninterrupted operation of our business. Now our ABC tracks which of these suppliers least affect our water and carbon footprints because we want to work with these suppliers.

An advantage of beginning downstream was the existence of large retail chains such as Walmart, Auto Mercado and Perimercados. On the other end of the spectrum, there were thousands of small liquor stores and traditional mom-and-pop stores, called “pulperías”, located throughout the country. FIFCO had already begun point-of-sale recycling initiatives with both types of retailers, and some even participated as volunteers in recycling programs.

Some strong supporters of the triple bottom line within FIFCO, while not opposed to spreading this philosophy to business partners in the value chain, believed that priority should be placed on further consolidating the strategy inside the company.

Exhibit 1

Financial Statements, 2008-2011
Years ending September 30th (in millions of colones)
Florida Ice & Farm Company, S.A. and Subsidiaries

Balance Sheets	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total Current Assets	105	111	119	141
Total Fixed Assets	330	351	326	328
Total Assets	436	462	445	469
Total Current Liabilities	96	56	60	68
Total Long-Term Liabilities	101	140	118	119
Total Capital	240	266	267	282
Total Liabilities and Capital	436	462	445	469
<i>Exchange rate US\$, as of Sept. 30th</i>	549.59	582.49	502.55	508.36
Statements of Income and Expenses	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total sales	280	278	290	317
Total cost of goods sold	125	123	122	133
Gross Profit	155	154	167	184
Operating Profit	58	59	66	71
Net profits for shareholders	24	23	27	29
<i>Exchange rate, average (Set. - Set.)</i>	532.99	566.07	542.23	506.57

Source: Financial statements published on the webpage of FIFCO

Exhibit 2

Strategic Goals and Objectives

Dimensions	Goals	Strategic Priorities
1. Environmental	Improve Florida's environmental performance	1. Efficient use of water resource 2. Efficient use of energy and decrease of transmission of greenhouse gases 3. Proper management of solid waste
	2. Social	Internal Improve the quality of life of our employees and their families
External Have a positive impact in the communities where we operate		3. Talent Development 2. Social Strategic Investment
3. Economic	Generate economic value for our shareholders and other stakeholders 1. Creation of economic value 2. Market Leadership 3. Growth in sales and profit	1. Promotion of responsible alcohol consumption 2. Market Leadership 3. Transparency and Ethics

Source: Florida Ice & Farm Co.'s Annual Sustainability Report 2010

Exhibit 3


Example of FIFCO's Sustainability Balanced Scorecard

Triple bottom line dimensions' weight in the overall firm performance

Dimension	2005	2008	2011	Future
Environmental	0%	0%	10%	20%
Social	0%	30%	30%	30%
Economical	100%	70%	60%	50%

All employees were able to keep track of their performance and their subordinates regularly on the company's intranet system (as shown below). When a person entered the system online, he or she found the following information:

Part #1 – Corporate, Individual and Total Progress:



Part #2 – Goals and Progress per Indicator:

Indicador	Meta	Actual	%	Tendencia
0007 - Nivel de Calidad	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0008 - Nivel de Seguridad	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0009 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0010 - Nivel de Rentabilidad	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0011 - Nivel de Innovación	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0012 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0013 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0014 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0015 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0016 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0017 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0018 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0019 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0020 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0021 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0022 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0023 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0024 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0025 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0026 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0027 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0028 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0029 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0030 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0031 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0032 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0033 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0034 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0035 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0036 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0037 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0038 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0039 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0040 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0041 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0042 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0043 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0044 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0045 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0046 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0047 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0048 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0049 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0050 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0051 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0052 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0053 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0054 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0055 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0056 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0057 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0058 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0059 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0060 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0061 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0062 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0063 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0064 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0065 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0066 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0067 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0068 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0069 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0070 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0071 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0072 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0073 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0074 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0075 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0076 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0077 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0078 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0079 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0080 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0081 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0082 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0083 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0084 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0085 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0086 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0087 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0088 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0089 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0090 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0091 - Nivel de Innovación del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0092 - Nivel de Responsabilidad Social del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0093 - Nivel de Sostenibilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0094 - Nivel de Eficiencia Operativa del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0095 - Nivel de Calidad del Servicio del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0096 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0097 - Nivel de Calidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0098 - Nivel de Seguridad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0099 - Nivel de Satisfacción del Cliente del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔
0100 - Nivel de Rentabilidad del Proyecto	100.00%	98.30%	98.30%	↔

Source: FIFCO's Balanced Scorecard System

Exhibit 4

Patterns of Alcohol Consumption Costa Rica vs. Québec

Country/Region	Costa Rica ¹	Québec ²
Consumers (%)	57%	82%
Dangerous Consumption	4%	2%
Occasional Excessive Consumption (drinks/per time)	16%	3%
Frequency (days/week)	5	2.5
Association	1.75	4
	“Party”	“Pleasure”

Source: (1) FLACSO: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
(2) Educ´Alcohol Québec